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Assessing Adler:
The Weight of Constitutional History and
the Future of Religious Freedom
Benjamin L. Berger*

INTRODUCTION
On most surveys of the constellation of cases that contribute to the
image of Canada’s distinctive constitutional history, Adler v Ontario1
appears very faintly, if at all. This is not because the ruling in Adler was
trivial. The case was a significant holding on the interpretation of s 93 of
the Constitution Act, 1867, and helped build the world of denominational
education funding in which Ontarians continue to live. It also contributed
to the development of certain intriguing constitutional principles,
including the notion that one part of the Constitution cannot be used to
challenge another. Interesting though those points may be in their own
way, in the hands of most, Adler’s significance ends there. It is not treated
as one of the touchstone cases in Canadian constitutional history and is
often passed over in introductory constitutional law classes. Even within
the narrower horizon of Canada’s law and religion jurisprudence, it has a
Professor and Associate Dean (Students), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
I wish to thank Jamie Shilton for his superb research assistance and insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as Kate Glover Berger and the participants in the
Asper Centre Constitutional Roundtable in the Fall of 2017 for their generous and
helpful engagement with this text and my ideas.
*

1

[1996] 2 SCR 609 [Adler].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269535

Forthcoming in the National Journal of Constitutional Law (2018) (Pre-publication Version)

modest profile compared to pre-Charter cases like Saumur v City of Quebec2
and Chaput v Romain.3 And treatments of post-Charter developments tend
to move swiftly from key early rulings on s 2(a), like Big M4 and Edwards
Books,5 to the rich contemporary jurisprudence interpreting and applying
that right, touching only lightly on Adler. In other words, on most
accounts, Adler is largely a case of boutique significance to those interested
in the history of religion and education in Canada.
Adler might thus seem something of a curious choice for a collection
looking at key cases in Canada’s constitutional history; if one were
searching for a defining case in the interaction of law and religion, one
would be wholly forgiven for looking past Adler. It did not establish new
principles of general importance or steer a new course for any aspect of
Canadian constitutional law; indeed, it was an essentially conservative
outcome. When attention is turned to Adler, it is as part of the perduring
(and often heated) political debates about Catholic school funding in
Ontario and analysis tends to focus either on whether Adler was rightly
decided or on how the ruling can be overcome by policy change or
constitutional amendment.6 My purpose in looking again at Adler is not to
contribute to that debate (though I will return to the question of whether
the ruling is vulnerable at the end of this paper), nor am I seeking to
generate a “eureka moment” in which the reader will discover that the
holdings in Adler are much more significant to contemporary
constitutional lives than we otherwise recognized. They are not.
My more modest claim is that certain features of the decision make
Adler a distinctively useful perch from which to look backwards and
forwards in time at the constitutional interaction of law and religion. The
case provides a good line of sight on certain themes central to our
2

[1953] 2 SCR 299 [Saumur].

3

[1955] SCR 834.

4

R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 [Big M].

5

R v Edwards Books, [1986] 2 SCR 713.

For an account of these political debates, and a political argument for the funding of
some religious schools based on a “right to culture,” see Linda A White, “Liberalism,
Group Rights and the Boundaries of Toleration: The Case of Minority Religious Schools
in Ontario” (2003) 36:5 Canadian Journal of Political Science 975.
6
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constitutional history with religion, and offers a clear view of issues that
would define the religion jurisprudence post-Adler and that we can see on
the path ahead. My case for Adler’s importance is, thus, more as lens than
as linchpin.
Given its lesser stature, before outlining those themes and issues
that I want to draw out using Adler, a brief refresher might be helpful. At
issue was whether the educational funding scheme in Ontario offended
the appellants’ religious freedom and equality rights. The decision was
released 9 years after Reference Re Bill 30,7 in which the majority of the
Court upheld Ontario legislation that extended public funding to Catholic
separate schools. Justice Wilson, writing for the majority of the Court in
that case, found that the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial
power under s 93 that made good on the requirement to fully fund Roman
Catholic schools. And although the public funding of Catholic schools
but no other separate schools “sits uncomfortably with the concept of
equality embodied in the Charter,” Justice Wilson explained, the legislation
was “immune” from Charter review under ss 2(a) and 15 because “[i]t was
never intended…that the Charter could be used to invalidate other
provisions of the Constitution, particularly a provision such as s 93 which
represented a fundamental part of the Confederation compromise.”8 The
appellants in Adler drew the Court’s attention back to Charter questions
surrounding educational funding in Ontario, arguing first that s 2(a)
requires public funding for independent religious schools and, second,
that funding Catholic and public schools but not other separate religious
schools offended the equality guarantee in s 15.9 Justice Iacobucci, writing
for the majority of the Court, rejected the s 2(a) argument, holding that any
claim of public support for religious education had to be found in s 93, and
that s 2(a) could not “be used to enlarge upon s. 93’s constitutionally
blessed scheme for public funding of denominational schools”,10 which he

7

[1987] 1 SCR 1148 [Bill 30].

8

Ibid at 1197–1198.

The appellants also raised a question regarding the provision of health support
services only in public schools, but this claim was similarly rejected by the majority of
the Court.
9

10

Adler, supra note 1 at para 28.
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described as a “‘comprehensive code’ of denominational school rights.”11
With respect to the equality claim, Justice Iacobucci leaned on the Bill 30
case, holding that “funding for public schools is insulated from Charter
attack as legislation enacted pursuant to the plenary power granted to the
provincial legislatures as part of the Confederation compromise.”12
Although the province has the power to extend funding to other
denominational schools if it so chooses, “the funding of public schools
coupled with the non-funding of private religious schools is immune from
Charter attack”.13
There were three other sets of reasons in Adler. Justice Sopinka
(with Major J) concurred, but, rather than relying on the arrangement’s
immunity from Charter scrutiny, reasoned that the appellants’ s 2(a) rights
were not breached because the costs incurred by the appellants associated
with sending their children to private religious schools “is a natural cost
of the appellants’ religion and does not, therefore, constitute an
infringement of their freedom of religion.”14 With respect to s 15, the
public school legislation was making no distinction on the basis of religion
— these were secular schools open to all, irrespective of religion, and any
distinction thus flowed from the appellants’ choices — so there could be
no Charter equality problem. Justice McLachlin (as she then was) also
found no breach of s 2(a),15 but would have found a breach of s 15 on the
basis that “while secular schooling is in theory available to all members of
the public, the appellants’ religious beliefs preclude them from sending
their children to public schools.”16 The burdens thereby imposed on the
11

Ibid at para 27.

Ibid at para 47. He later clarifies that this is not to say that “no legislation in respect of
public schools is subject to Charter scrutiny”. It is just “the fact of their existence… that
is immune from Charter challenge. Whenever the government decides to go beyond the
confines of this special mandate, the Charter could be successfully invoked to strike
down the legislation in question.” (para 49)
12

13

Ibid at para 50.

14

Ibid at para 176.

She based this conclusion on the fact that the scheme involved no compulsion or
prohibition, which she understood as central to the protections afforded by s 2(a) of the
Charter. See ibid, paras 198–200.
15

16

Ibid at para 209.
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appellants based on their religion offended s 15, but McLachlin J would
have justified this breach under s 1 on the basis that denying funding to
separate religious schools (beyond the constitutionally-mandated funding
of Catholic schools) is necessary and proportionate to protect the public
education system, the purpose of which, she explained, is to encourage “a
more tolerant harmonious multicultural society”.17 In a decision that laid
significant weight on the role of religious education in the continuation
and health of communities that she regarded as insular and vulnerable,
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé dissented. She too found a breach of s 15 but,
unlike Justice McLachlin, she would not have saved the breach under s 1.
In her view, the government had not discharged its burden of showing
that partial funding for these religious schools was not a less-impairing
alternative, and the deleterious impacts of complete non-funding on these
communities outweighed the largely financial benefits of this policy.
That description of the case in mind, I now turn to my reading of
Adler that positions it at a provocative place in the arc of the development
of the constitutional interaction of law and religion in Canada. In what
follows I draw from both the majority and the minority and dissenting
reasons in Adler to expose and explore some themes that shape not only
our religion jurisprudence, but Canadian constitutionalism more
generally. I begin in the next section by examining the powerful role
played in the majority’s reasons by the historical interaction of law and
religion at the origins of the country, and what this suggests about the
competing logics at work in Canadian constitutional life. That discussion
leads, in turn, to a reflection on the central place of claims about law and
religion in Canadian nation-building and federalism, a role that it turns
out is abiding, not just historical. Part III of the paper then looks forward
from Adler, first exploring an issue that the case foreshadowed as a central
vehicle for the future development of the law and religion jurisprudence
in the subsequent 20 years: education and, in particular, the education of
children. I then turn to consider the group or collective aspect of religion,
an issue that was exposed in the reasons in Adler, but that would lie in
relative abeyance until very recently, when it reemerged as a central
question for the future of law and religion in Canada. The piece concludes

17

Ibid at para 215.
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with a return to the doctrinal points decided in Adler, asking whether the
future of Adler might itself be in question.
LOOKING BACKWARD
Constitutional Logics and the Durability of Origins
One of the most notable features of the majority reasons in Adler is
the way that they invoke constitutional history as not just informative but
dispositive of the issues before the Court. The heart of Justice Iacobucci’s
reasons is the telling of a story about the constitutional origins of the
country and an appeal to certain self-evident consequences of that
narrative. Section 93, he explains, is a “child born of historical exigency”;18
it is “the product of an historical compromise which was a crucial step
along the road leading to Confederation.”19 Justice Iacobucci’s claim about
origins is ambitious. Indeed, he ultimately casts s 93 as more than
“crucial”. In his telling it is, in fact, a sine qua non for the existence of the
country: “Without this ‘solemn pact’, this ‘cardinal term’ of Union, there
would have been no Confederation.”20 Whatever the historical accuracy
of this account, what is most revealing is the set of implications that he
draws from it. In Justice Iacobucci’s hands, this origin story serves as a
complete answer to the appellants’ claims in Adler: the educational
funding arrangement established by s 93 is simply exempt from Charter
review. As though it is a logical proof, Justice Iacobucci explains that “the
public school system is an integral part of the Confederation compromise
and, consequently, receives a protection against constitutional or Charter
attack.”21

18

Ibid at para 30.

19

Ibid at para 29.

20

Ibid at para 29.

Ibid at para 46. Cossman and Schneiderman describe Iacobucci J’s approach as
“something of a dodge” in that “[h]e preferred not to take McLachlin J’s path of
assessing the weight of the Adler parent’s constitutional claim. Instead, he chose the
more formalistic path, in which he was barred constitutionally from considering their
21
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Of greatest interest to me is what is involved in that rhetorically
overburdened word “consequently.” The weakness of Justice Iacobucci’s
argument on this issue is pointed out by Justices Sopinka and McLachlin,
who both observe in their reasons that immunity from Charter review does
not follow naturally from the fact that a matter was part of the
Confederation constitution.22 Justice Sopinka makes the convincing
argument that, apart from the guarantee to fund Roman Catholic schools,
the plenary power over public education “is entrenched only to the same
extent that other powers in s. 92 are entrenched. It is in the Constitution
and like other powers can be exercised only in conformity with the
Charter.”23 That being so, the interesting question is how we understand
the peculiar weight that the majority gives to the constitutional history
surrounding law, religion, and education. What does this point to?
One answer is that this somewhat frail reasoning is a consequence
of the majority’s concern to stay away from the significant budgetary and
political issues that it felt would flow from subjecting this unequal
arrangement to Charter scrutiny. If the five judges in the majority could
not see a path of reasoning that avoided a breach or could save that breach,
perhaps a little bit of tortured reasoning was a small price to pay. Even if
part of the answer, this is not a full or satisfying explanation of why this
reasoning carried the day. There is something else, something larger,
going on here.
I have elsewhere argued that to understand Canadian
constitutional culture, at both a structural level and also in the finer strokes
surrounding given issues, one must appreciate that Canadians are
children of two constitutional logics: that of the local, the particular, and
of harmonious relations between diverse communities achieved through
political compromise; and that of the universal and faith in the reason of
legal principle.24 These competing logics are not pure forms of some sort
claims on the merits.” Brenda Cossman & David Schneiderman, “Beyond Intersecting
Rights: The Constitutional Judge as ‘Complex Self’” (2007) 57:2 UTLJ 431 at 440–441.
22

See Adler, supra note 1 at paras 143 and 194, respectively.

23

Ibid at para 143.

Benjamin L Berger, “Children of Two Logics: A Way into Canadian Constitutional
Culture” (2013) 11:2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 319.
24
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but, rather, imaginative formations about the nature of government,
community, and authority that pull on one another at all points. Tracking
the abiding relationship between these two logics of constitutionalism is
crucial to understanding the nature of Canadian constitutional culture.
Prior to the Charter, the heart of the Canadian constitutional project
was the logic of compromise, relativism, and local interest, negotiated into
workable configurations that bound communities together. Nobility lay
in making government work here, in this place, given local conditions, and
the specific interests of given communities. Canadian constitutionalism
was an exercise in the logic of the particular; it was consummately political.
With the Charter, the culture of Canadian constitutionalism shifted. The
logic of universal human rights and freedoms, focused on the relationship
between state and citizen, migrated to the centre of public consciousness
about what Canadian constitutionalism entails. This is a constitutionalism
in which the all-purpose reason of proportionality balancing is the lodestar
of good governance, just as it is across the Western world.25 One cannot
appreciate Canadian constitutionalism without recognizing that this
second, powerful logic has never entirely displaced the first.26 When we
find that the particular or political resists annexation by the logic of the
For a sense of the dominance of ideas of proportionality in modern thinking about
constitutionalism, see, e.g., Robert Alexy, “Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and
Rationality” (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131; David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Aharon Barak, “Proportional Effect: The
Israeli Experience” (2007) 57 UTLJ 369. For a critical discussion of the descriptive
sufficiency of such theories, see Grégoire CN Webber, “Proportionality, Balancing, and
the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship” (2010) 23 Can JL & Jur 179; Benjamin L
Berger, “The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and the
Modern Constitutional Imagination” (2011) 61:4 UTLJ 579.
25

In an article exploring the so-called “no hierarchy of rights doctrine,” of which he sees
Iacobucci J’s reasons serving as an example, Mark Carter explains the majority reasons
as reflecting a view “that the Constitution is a somewhat fragile amalgam of responses
to political and historical contingencies and curious normative mandates.” Mark Carter,
“An Analysis of the ‘No Hierarchy of Constitutional Rights’ Doctrine” (2006) 12:1
Review of Constitutional Studies 19 at 40. “It is no surprise, therefore,” Carter explains,
“that parts of the Constitution that guarantee rights and privileges in a manner that
reflects various historic exigencies — e.g., denominational school guarantees of the
confederation period, language education rights of the patriation period — may not
measure up to the particular rational demands of the universal human rights values that
are contained in the Charter” (ibid).
26
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universal we have our hands on something important. At such points the
obduracy of the particular is expressing something essential about
constitutional identity.
Adler marked one such point in Canadian constitutional history and
can be read as an expression of a constitutional system shaped by
competing logics. When Justice Iacobucci invokes the solemnity and
historical centrality of s 93 he is appealing to the durability and force of the
older logic of the constitution as political compromise. And yet the
appellants were correct: this historical compact could not be squared
neatly with a principled commitment to religious freedom and equality.27
As the UN Human Rights Committee put it so evocatively in its decision
of the same year, finding Canada in violation of article 26 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for this educational
funding arrangement, “the fact that a distinction is enshrined in the
Constitution does not render it reasonable and objective.”28 Quite so. But
the UNHRC is not embedded in Canadian constitutional culture or
responsible for reflecting core features of our constitutional experience. As
I read it, the majority reasons in Adler are seeking to capture an intuition
that this part of the Constitution and the Charter are simply up to different
things, each giving expression to different aspects of our constitutional
identity. The Catholic schooling question participates in one of the grand
narratives of Canadian self-understanding. The story of Canada as built
on two foundational cultures — the English and the French — has been,
despite its under-inclusivity, basic to Canadian self-understanding, and
In his discussion of Adler and section 93, Richard Moon seeks to square this,
proposing “a liberal or principled interpretation of the provision — a reading of the
provision as a minority right”. This is a reading, he suggests, that, given historical
change and the contemporary “non-denominational” nature of public schools, would
support either “the ending of separate school rights in Ontario now that the reason for
these rights has ceased to exist”, or the extension of this right to other religious groups
in the province.” (Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) at 166–
167.) I return to the plausibility of a reinterpretation of section 93 in the conclusion of
this article, but for now it is worthwhile noting that Moon’s interpretation depends
precisely on overwriting the historical logic of community specificity with the a modern
liberal logic. My argument is that, apart from the possibility of doing so, it is the
resistance to doing so that is of interest for one interested in understanding constitutional
identity.
27

28

Waldman v Canada, HCROR, 76th Sess, Annex, Communication No 694/1996 (1996).
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the question of Catholic and Protestant schooling, particularly Catholic
schooling in Ontario, is a kind of synecdoche for this larger narrative.29
These origins were not something that the Court was willing to see as
wholly digestible by the reason of the Charter.
Perhaps one way of understanding this role for constitutional
history in Adler using concepts more recently invoked by the Court itself
is that the majority in Adler was describing the particular funding
arrangement surrounding religion and education as a part of Canada’s
“constitutional architecture.”30 Not a policy or systemic design question
like others, this compromise had to be understood in fundamentally
historical terms and as expressing a distinctive political arrangement.
Thus established, a change would have to be a matter of amendment that
follows on a new political self-understanding.31 If a change is to occur —
and it may — it will signal a change in the basic narratives of the
constitutional culture, not a sudden realization of the unreasonableness of
the prior arrangement. Indeed, in all of these dimensions, including in the
overarching narrative of nation-building to which the Court appeals, there
are resonances between Adler and the Supreme Court Reference in which the
Court recently leaned on this idea of “constitutional architecture”.
Looking back — and watching as the Court itself looked back —
Adler perhaps reflects a moment at which religion, and its historical role in
the formation of Canada, became the occasion for exposing something
deep about Canadian constitutional identity and the relationship between
the two constitutional logics that we all inhabit. But this conclusion pushes
us to further questions: what precisely is the relationship between law,
religion, and Canadian nation-building, and does that relationship persist?

On the role of appeal to grand narratives in the persuasive task of reason-giving, see
Paul W Kahn, Making the Case: The Art of the Judicial Opinion (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2016).
29

Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 [Supreme Court Reference];
Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32.
30

31

As, of course, it was in both Québec and Newfoundland.
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Religion, Nation Building, and Federalism
In a 2003 article, Talal Asad observed that “[a]ll modern states, even
those committed to promoting ‘tolerance,’ are built on complicated
emotional inheritances that determine relations among its citizens.”32 The
heavy reliance on constitutional history in the majority reasons in Adler
points to some of the deep “emotional inheritances” that have shaped the
Canadian state and, as I argued above, constitutional identity. Asad’s
statement was part of a reflection on the French debates of the time
surrounding the wearing of the so-called “Islamic Veil” (the hijab). He
argued that the invocation of laïcité — a particular brand of secularism
with political currency in France shaped by its distinctive emotional
inheritances — could be understood as part of the process by which the
French state asserted its republican personality or identity. Asad’s piece
is an important reflection on the way in which, in these debates, the French
state made use of its relationship with religion to establish and defend —
to “confirm,”33 in Asad’s words — its sovereignty.
I suggest that the majority’s heavy reliance in Adler on the historical
constitutional relationship with religion can be taken as an invitation to
see the ways in which Asad’s description was historically true in Canada
as well, and continues to be true in important ways. In our constitutional
lives, religion is not simply a social fact to be managed, or something that
is acted upon constitutionally; it is part of the material that is manipulated
in nation-building, informing the politics of sovereignty and federalism in
continuingly important ways. It is easier for Canadians to see the role of
religion as part of the raw material for nation-building when we look
elsewhere in the world. Appreciation for the role of religion in constituting
the sovereign state is unavoidable when one considers states like India or
Israel. Turkey and Pakistan also spring to mind as contemporary cases in
which religion is stitched deeply into the formation and constitutional
politics of the modern state. Benjamin Schonthal has shown how this

Talal Asad, “French Secularism and the ‘Islamic Veil Affair’” (2003) 8 The Hedgehog
Review 93 at 102.
32

33

Ibid at 101.
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continues to work itself out in complicated ways in Sri Lanka. 34 But this
relationship between religion and nation-building is equally, though
differently, apparent in Canada, as the Adler majority’s Charterimmunizing appeal to constitutional history indicates.
An important part of the story of the role of religion in the
constitution (in both senses of that word) of Canada is a narrative about
colonialism and Indigenous peoples. Religion — both its use and its
suppression — was central in shaping the foundational relationship
between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples. The early colonial
project was one in which religious missionaries played a crucial role,
sometimes extending state power and sometimes aligning with
Indigenous communities in advocating for the recognition of Aboriginal
rights and sovereignty.35 With the expansion westward of the Canadian
state and its claims for sovereignty, the Federal government banned
Indigenous religious rituals and practices such as the potlatch as part of its
effort to consolidate political and economic control over Indigenous
people and their territories. There is a dialectic here between denials of
religion and denials of sovereignty, and thus between denials of religious
freedom and the yearning to transform a wish for colonial sovereignty into
political and constitutional fact.
One sees these links between religion and the flexing of political
sovereignty clearly, though tragically, in the history of the residential
school system in Canada. In a devastating project aimed at cultural
extinguishment, the Canadian state worked with the churches in
administering this system.
Indigenous communities are still,
inspirationally, overcoming its ruinous effects, which continue to
condition the political and legal relationship between the Canadian state
and Indigenous peoples.36 This history is the subject of increasing
Benjamin Schonthal, Buddhism, Politics and the Limits of Law: The Pyrrhic
Constitutionalism of Sri Lanka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
34

Hamar Foster & Benjamin L Berger, “From Humble Prayers to Legal Demands: The
Cowichan Petition of 1909 and the British Columbia Indian Land Question” in Hamar
Foster & Benjamin L Berger, eds, The Grand Experiment: Law and Legal Culture in British
Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 240.
35

For an essential history, see JR Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision: A History of Native
Residential Schools (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). For recent scholarship
examining what a reconstructed constitutional relationship might look like, see, e.g.,
36
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understanding and study amongst scholars of Indigenous law and politics
in Canada, but it is rarely meaningfully analyzed as part of the history of
religious freedom and difference in Canada. The story of religion, state,
and Indigenous peoples must be excavated and studied as a central part
of the distinctive history — the emotional inheritances — of law and
religion in Canada; and central to that story is the relationship between
political identity, religion, and claims to sovereignty.
But the majority reasons in Adler also point directly to the way in
which this tethering of religion and sovereignty was also core to the
development and identity of Canadian constitutional federalism. The
Treaty of Paris,37 which marked the end of the Seven Years’ War and
imperial hostilities in Canada, acknowledged the political and practical
realities of British rule over a substantial French Catholic population with
the following guarantee, something of an early protection of religious
freedom: “His Britannick Majesty, on his side, agrees to grant the liberty
of the Catholick religion to the inhabitants of Canada: he will, in
consequence, give the most precise and effectual orders, that his new
Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion
according to the rites of the Romish church, as far as the law of Great
Britain permit.” The Quebec Act, 1774,38 another crucial step in the
constitutional history of Canada, included similar provisions providing
special rights to the Roman Catholic Church, and the Constitutional Act,
179139 extended privileges and protections to the Anglican Church in
recognition of its special status in England.40 This history of the formative
John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the
Implementation of Historical Treaties (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press,
2017); Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds, From Recognition to Reconciliation:
Essays on the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2016); John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous
Constitutionalism (Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2016).
37

(1763) France, Britain, and Spain, 10 February 1763.

38

(UK), 14 Geo III, c 83.

39

(UK), 31 Geo III, c 31.

Janet Epp Buckingham, Fighting over God: A Legal and Political History of Religious
Freedom in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014); MH Ogilvie, Religious
Institutions and the Law in Canada, 4th ed, Essentials of Canadian law (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2017).
40
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relationship between French and English communities, refracted through
their constitutive religious identities, found expression at confederation
with s 93. It is that politico-religious dynamic that Justice Iacobucci
invokes when he speaks of s 93 as a ‘solemn pact’ without which “there
would have been no Confederation”;41 historically, both our federal
structure and the development of a sovereign state are tightly imbricated
with religious identity. As in the case of Indigenous peoples — but with
such a fundamentally difference valence — sovereignty and nation were
forged in part using particular claims about the state’s relationship with
religion and attitude towards religious difference.
But this link between religion, sovereignty, and nation is not merely
a matter of the mists of our constitutional history. We see the enduring
expression of this genetic link in our most prominent contemporary
debates. In the fall of 2013, a minority sovereigntist Parti Québécois
government introduced Bill 60, a bill referred to as the “Charter of Québec
Values” or, as it was called in much of the debate that ensued, the “Charter
of Secularism.”42 The Bill sought to respond to one of the most contentious
political issues within Québec at the time, the accommodation and
management of religious difference. It did so by declaring the religious
neutrality and secular nature of the state and with a contentious
prohibition on employees of public bodies from wearing “ostentatious” or
conspicuous religious symbols, such as turbans, kippot, and headscarves.
With this proposed ban, the Parti Québecois government charted out a
form of secularism for Québec quite at odds with Canadian constitutional
wisdom and thereby ignited a fierce debate, both inside and outside of
Québec. Most agreed that if it were passed and challenged in the courts,
this Bill would be declared unconstitutional in light of the Canadian
Charter, as well as inconsistent with Québec’s own human rights
commitments. For a variety of reasons, the Parti Québécois suffered a
resounding defeat in a snap election at the centre of which they placed this
proposal. Owing to that defeat, the “Charter of Secularism” moved
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Adler, supra note 1 at para 29.

Charter affirming the values of state secularism and religious neutrality and of equality
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temporarily to the political background, though echoes of it have
reappeared in recent years.43
This unfolding of events is illuminating for my purposes because of
the different stories that can be told about this proposed charter and why
it emerged in Québec.44 One story is about the progressive stripping of
religion from Québec culture and politics — the “secularization” of
Québec. Since the 1960s and the “Quiet Revolution,” the Catholic Church
had been ousted from its former position of overt cultural and political
influence.45 From a highly Catholic society since prior to Confederation,
Québec had become less and less overtly religious and its strong identity
with the Catholic religion had been replaced with something more akin to
a pervasive antipathy. The “Charter of Secularism” sought to formalize a
French form of laïcité that (however anachronistically) was felt to be more
natural and fitted to Québec society than the multiculturalism found
elsewhere in the country. And so one way of reading this proposed charter
is as the next move in this progressive marginalization of religion in
Québec’s political life. This is a story of discontinuity and change from a
Catholic past to a secular present, the artefact of a fundamental shift in the
role of religion in Québec’s legal and political life. And there is much that
is true about this story.

See Catherine Porter, “Behind Quebec’s Ban on Face Coverings, a Debate Over
Identity”, The New York Times (25 October 2017), online:
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/canada/quebec-ban-facecoverings.html>; Philip Authier, “‘Public services should be given and received with an
open face’: Couillard”, Montreal Gazette (20 October 2017), online:
<http://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/despite-controversy-bill-62-on-stateneutrality-sails-into-law-in-a-badly-split-vote>.
43

I explore these contending stories and the lessons that can be drawn from them at
more length in Benjamin L Berger, “Faith in Sovereignty: Religion and Secularism in the
Politics of Canadian Federalism” (2014) 35:4 Istituzioni del Federalismo 939.
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For more on the Quiet Revolution, see Gregory Baum, “Catholicism and
Secularization in Quebec” in David Lyon & Marguerite Van Die, eds, Rethinking Church,
State, and Modernity: Canada Between Europe and America (Toronto; Buffalo; London:
University of Toronto Press, 2000) 149; David Seljak, “Why the Quiet Revolution was
‘Quiet’: The Catholic Church’s Reaction to the Secularization of Nationalism in Quebec
after 1960” (1996) 62 Historical Studies 109.
45

15
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269535

Forthcoming in the National Journal of Constitutional Law (2018) (Pre-publication Version)

But another (and I think deeper) account reads the “Charter of
Québec Values” as a story of continuity in the structural relationship
whereby a distinctive relationship with religion has consistently been
invoked as a dimension of the politics of federalism in Canada and an
emblem or standard for Québec’s political sovereignty. In the early years,
Roman Catholicism was the foundation of the religious uniqueness of
Québec, a singularity that was part of the basis for securing political
identity within the Canadian state; today, the terms that mark that
difference have shifted from “Roman Catholicism” to “laïcité,” but the
essential role played by appeal to a unique relationship with religion has
remained. At a time at which there was an apparent lack of general
appetite on questions of sovereignty, the assertion of a distinctive
relationship to religion — here, a different conception of the secular —
served political purposes in invigorating a debate about Québec’s unique
place in the federation. The preamble to the “Charter of Québec Values”
is revealing: “Whereas equality between women and men and the primacy
of the French language as well as the separation of religions and state and
the religious neutrality and secular nature of the state are fundamental
values of the Québec nation…”.46 Defining a distinctive relationship with
religion has always been a key aspect of how Québec has distinguished its
political character from that of the rest of Canada and this has very much
survived the Quiet Revolution. Federalism is fundamentally concerned
with the construction and negotiation of political identity. And given the
historically central role that religion has played in the definition of
community belonging and national identity in Canada, it would be
surprising, indeed, if contemporary debates about religion and
contemporary debates about federalism did not converge and interact.
Reading Adler is, thus, an evocative way of looking back and seeing
the relationship between religion, sovereignty, and nation building in
Canadian constitutional history. The story that Justice Iacobucci tells in
his majority reasons, and the dispositive force that he gives to these
historical dynamics, speaks to only part of the “complicated emotional
inheritances” surrounding religion and the state in Canada. But hearing
that story, we are invited to broaden our gaze and think about the other
ways in which the management, invocation, and suppression of religion
46
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16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269535

Forthcoming in the National Journal of Constitutional Law (2018) (Pre-publication Version)

has been key to shaping the constitutional and political order in which we
live. It also directs us forward, suggesting ways in which religion and the
encounter with religious difference continues to be an important force
shaping our constitutional politics even — indeed, especially — in a
political and legal world committed to some vision of secularism and state
neutrality. With that nudge forward, I now turn to the ways in which Adler
not only shed light on our constitutional history of law and religion, but
anticipated key axes of debate in our law of religious freedom in the years
to follow.
LOOKING FORWARD
The Role of Education
Adler was, of course, not the first case under the Charter that
engaged questions of freedom of religion and the education of children.
Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education47 saw the Ontario Court of Appeal
conclude that the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer at the start of school days
in public schools was an unjustified limitation on s 2(a). The Court ruled
that the purpose of the practice was religious (offending the principles set
out in Big M) and, moreover, that the effect of the practice was to impose
a form of religious coercion on students, inconsistent with freedom of
religion. Similarly, in Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Ontario (Minister
of Education),48 the same court held that a provincial regulation that
required periods of religious education in public schools was incompatible
with s 2(a) because it pursued a form of Christian religious indoctrination
incompatible with freedom from religious coercion.
And yet Adler marked a shift in the focus of these education cases,
one that would presage a key current in the development of the law of
religious freedom in Canada over the subsequent two decades. Early cases
like Zylberberg and CCLA, and even the Bill 30 case, were essentially
concerned with using section 2(a) to challenge the continued presence of
historical Christian elements within the public education system. They
47

(1988), 65 OR (2d) 641 (CA) [Zylberberg].

48

(1990), 71 OR (2d) 341 (CA) [CCLA].
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were cases in which claimants were, in one form or another, asserting
freedom from the vestiges of religious privilege embedded in the
education system. Adler presented a different kind of claim and, with it, a
different kind of problem: within a public education system, understood
as “secular” in one way or another,49 what space can be occupied by
religion? Rather than a claim about the liberty found in freedom from
religion, this species of concern about the meeting of religion and
education focused on the freedom to exercise religion within an
overarching secular school system. Following Adler, cases exploring this
style of claim would, in fact, serve as a — if not the — principal vehicle for
the exploration of key issues in the modern relationship between law and
religion in Canada. There are, of course, many important cases that are
not part of this current — cases like Amselem,50 Wilson Colony,51 Bruker,52
and NS53 — but the number and prominence of such religion and
education cases within the jurisprudence since Adler is both notable and
telling.
The case of Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 3654 involved the
question of the role that the religious views of the community and of
school board members could play in making decisions about books
appropriate for the public school curriculum, here books depicting same
sex parented families for a Kindergarten-Grade 1 class. Chamberlain
remains the Court’s most extended discussion of the meaning of
“secularism.” Trinity Western University55 raised the issue of whether a
private religious university that has a code of conduct that discriminates
against gay, lesbian, and queer students and faculty can have their teacher
training program publicly accredited. The case was a key moment in the
Court’s effort to delineate a boundary between private belief and public
And the understanding of “secularism” within both the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence and the scholarly literature is extremely unstable and always shifting.
49

50

Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 [Amselem].
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Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 [Wilson Colony].

52

Bruker v Markovitz, 2007 SCC 54 [Bruker].
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R v NS, 2012 SCC 72 [NS].
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[2002] 4 SCR 710 [Chamberlain].
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[2001] 1 SCR 772 [TWU 2001].
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conduct in matters of religion. Although the next installment in the Trinity
Western story did not involve the education of children, the Court’s
decisions regarding the accreditation of TWU’s proposed law school
engaged similar questions of religious freedom as they were expressed in
the relationship between religious education and public authorities.56
Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys57 famously called on the
Court to decide whether a Sikh student could carry his kirpan at public
school. The Court’s decision became a principal touchstone for national
debates about the nature and boundaries of religious accommodation.
And the recent case of Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General)58
posed the question of whether and how a private religious high school is
bound to implement a “neutral” program of education about world
religions and ethics. That decision is now the leading case on the fraught
question of the protection of group or community rights under section 2(a),
an issue about which I will have more to say in the next section.
The list is longer, but the point is clear from the foregoing: after
Adler, many of the chief issues in the contemporary law of religious
freedom in Canada has been worked out through debates about the
relationship between religion and public education in Canada. Indeed,
combining these decisions with the early Charter cases, Adler itself, and the
pre-Charter history explored above, both the deeper and the modern
histories of the legal relationship to religious diversity in Canada could be
told quite ably through a story about education.
My purpose in this section is not to rehearse the law flowing from
these cases. Instead, what interests me here is the question of why
education has served as a crucible for the relationship between law and
religion, such a dominant source of issues that raise axial questions in the
area.59 I want to explore two elements of an answer, one flowing directly
from the other, and the reasons given in Adler are my point of entry.
Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [TWU 2018];
Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33.
56
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2006 SCC 6 [Multani].
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2015 SCC 12 [Loyola].

I explore some of these ideas at greater length in Benjamin L Berger, “Religious
Diversity, Education, and the ‘Crisis’ in State Neutrality” (2014) 29:1 Canadian Journal
of Law and Society 103. For an account of some of the features that make religious
59
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In their respective reasons, Justice McLachlin and Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé map out the key elements of the first part of the answer.
As a step towards finding that there is an unjustified breach of the Charter,
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé describes “[t]he interests at stake for the
appellants” in the case as “the recognition and continuation of these
communities”.60 For her, the case presents a case involving “the efforts of
small, insular religious minority communities seeking to survive in a large,
secular society.”61 She accepts that “control over the education of their
children [is] essential to the continuation of the religious communities in
question,”62 and that “it is the very survival of these communities which is
threatened”63 by the distinction under the Education Act. By contrast,
Justice McLachlin, in her section 1 analysis, lays emphasis on the interest
that the state has in fostering, “a strong public secular school system
attended by students of all cultural and religious groups.”64 She notes the
“multicultural, multireligious” nature of Canadian society and observes
that “[a] multicultural multireligious society can only work, it is felt, if
people of all groups understand and tolerate each other.”65 “The goal of
fostering multiracial and multicultural harmony,” she explains, “is of great
importance in a society as diverse as ours.”66
Both the state and the religious community have a deep interest in
the formation of the child. For religious groups and the state alike,
education is the means by which culture, tradition, value, and community
are affirmed and sustained. All education is thus a political act, concerned
with inducing a child into a social world. It is true, as Justice L’HeureuxDubé, notes, that the continuation of the religious community — of a social
accommodation and toleration particularly fraught and vexing in educational contexts,
see Colin Macleod, “Toleration, Children and Education” 42:1 Educational Philosophy
and Theory 9.
60
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world — is at stake in the process of education. Education is an important
means by which religious beliefs, practices, and identity can be sustained
intergenerationally.67 But the state is similarly interested in the production
of a particular social world and the formation of an individual ethically
fitted for that world; as Justice McLachlin emphasizes, society also
depends on the cultivation of a certain type of citizen and education is its
principal tool in equipping the child with the knowledge and skills
necessary for critical and sensitive engagement in a diverse society.68 And,
of course, part of the state’s interest in education is in the formation of
individuals who have political and personal freedom and autonomy that
extends beyond the religious identity of their community.69
The fact of these deep, competing interests in the education of
children points to the second part of an answer to the question, “why is
education so central to the working out of issues of law and religion?” The
topic of education overflows and, in the process, erodes one of the
principal conceptual devices central to any aspiration to neatly “manage”
religion in a liberal constitutional order: the public/private divide. The
overlapping of community and state interests reflects the fact that
education is always both intensely private and intrinsically public in
character. We acknowledge the core role of the community and the family
in education at the same time that we recognize the consummately public
implications of any private decisions made about the education of
children. Nor does the distinction between belief and conduct offer much
to help in resolving issues that arise in matters of education: education is
keenly interested in and has implications for both. Denied easy recourse
to otherwise soothing divides, we are forced to contend with the deeper
and more difficult questions about the relationship of law and religion,
including the character of state neutrality, the relationship between
religious freedom and other constitutional rights, the boundaries of
For a discussion of the role of education in preserving and sustaining cultures, see
White, supra note 6.
67

This interest would be echoed years later by Justice Deschamps decision in another
religion and education case, in SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, when she
explained, at para 37, that “[p]arents are free to pass their personal beliefs on to their
children if they so wish. However, the early exposure of children to realities that differ
from those in their immediate family environment is a fact of life in society.”
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This is a theme that I develop in Berger, supra note 59.
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accommodation, and the nature and status of community or collective
rights. And so it ought to come as no real surprise that issues of public
education and religious difference continue to produce some of the most
fraught questions in freedom of religion. In the issues that it raised, and
in the divisions within the Court, Adler thus anticipated that education
would be a principal vehicle for working out central issues in the
contemporary interaction of law and religion in Canada.
The Question of the Collective
Adler’s foreshadowing of the key role that education would play in
the development of the constitutional jurisprudence surrounding religion
contains within it the seed of another dynamic that would unfold in the
subsequent Charter law. At the heart of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s
insistence on the equal treatment of religion in her dissenting decision was
a concern for the relationship between religion and the collective. She
acknowledged that the religious interest at work for the appellants in Adler
was connected to the “continuation of the religious communities in
question”70 and characterized the essence of the case as centred on a
group-based concern: “the efforts of small, insular religious minority
communities seeking to survive in a large, secular society.”71 Although
framed within a section 15(1) equality analysis rather than under section
2(a), the group or collective dimension of the constitutional protection of
religion was very much at the heart of her analysis. Justice Iacobucci gave
much less regard to the collective interests of the claimants in the case,
though by emphasizing the Confederation compromise, he could be
understood as privileging the political settlements as between religious
groups over the claims brought by individual claimants under the Charter.
And Justice Sopinka, who so emphasized the choices of parents as the root
of any pernicious effects suffered through the educational funding
scheme, gave no meaningful regard to groups and collective interests. The
decision was a “loss” for the religious communities concerned with the
education funding scheme in Ontario, but Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had, in
70
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her dissent, sounded a clear call for attention to the interests of religious
communities and groups under the Charter.
Notes of regard for the collective dimensions of religious life, and
the salience of those dimensions in constitutional rights analysis, predated
Adler. Recall Justice Rand’s statement in Saumur that freedom of religion
ought to be understood as one of the “original freedoms which are at once
the necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of human beings and
the primary conditions of their community life within a legal order.”72
Freedom of religion, for him, included concern both for the individual and
the “conditions of their community life”. But in the post-Charter section
2(a) jurisprudence the overwhelming tendency has been to prioritize the
individual and his or her personal religious freedom, rather than — and
sometimes at the expense of — understanding religion as inherently tied
to communities and collectivities.73 The path was laid out in Big M, in
which Justice Dickson explained that “[w]ith the Charter, it [had] become
the right of every Canadian to work out for himself or herself what his or
her religious obligations, if any, should be.”74 But the individualist
rendering of religious freedom was doctrinally solidified in Amselem,75 in
which the Court adopted its subjective sincerity test for section 2(a).
Focussing on religion as being, in essence, “about freely and deeply held
personal convictions or beliefs,”76 the Court held that to gain access to the
protection of section 2(a) a claimant need only “demonstrate that he or she
sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with religion.”77
The practice or belief need not accord with the dogma or positions of
religious officials or communities; if this subjective sincerity exists, no
matter how idiosyncratic, section 2(a) protects against non-trivial
interferences with those practices and beliefs.
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Saumur, supra note 2 at 329.

I discuss this in Benjamin L Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of
Constitutionalism (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2015) at 66–78.
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A series of cases decided under section 2(a) bear the imprint of this
individualism, but the high-water mark came with the Court’s decision in
Wilson Colony,78 in which a small Hutterite community objected that the
requirement for a photograph on their drivers’ licenses unjustifiably
offended their right to religious freedom. Though she accepted that
religion has a “collective aspect,” Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the
majority explained that the “broader impact of the photo requirement on
the Wilson Colony community” was relevant only at the proportionality
stage of the analysis and did not “transform the essential claim… into an
assertion of a group right.”79 The collective religious interests at play in
the case thus became simply “costs” associated with the limitation on the
right, to be weighed against the benefits of the universal photo
requirement to society at large.
As in Adler, a strong call for regard for the collective dimensions of
religion came in the dissenting reasons, here given by Justice Abella. She
laid substantial weight on the collective aspects of the claim, emphasizing
the community’s concern with self-sufficiency and autonomy and noting
that these commitments were inextricable from the nature of the claim in
this case — they were the heart of the religious freedom and equality
claims. She cited Justice Ritchie’s statement in Hofer v Hofer explaining the
religious character of the community lifestyle for Hutterites: “[T]he
activities of the community were evidence of the living church.”80 The
collective dimension of the religious interests thus foregrounded, Justice
Abella would have found that the limitation on the right was unjustified.
The dynamics between the reasons in Adler were, in this respect, replicated
in Wilson Colony.
The solicitousness for the individual’s beliefs and choices that we
have seen in the Charter protection of religion is to be expected: liberal
constitutionalism sees the individual far more clearly than it does the
group, treating the individual as the primary unit of constitutional
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analysis.81 But when put into practice, an insistent individualism in the
legal understanding of religion effaces significant dimensions of religion
as experienced and lived outside the courtroom. Religion troubles the
law’s individualism; phenomenologically, much of what gets categorized
as religion has an irrepressibly collective dimension and is anchored in the
lives of communities, complicated though those lives — and
heterogeneous though the practices and beliefs within those communities
— might be.82 Even when framed by a priority on the individual, religion
cannot really be analyzed or understood without regard for the
communities in which it is lived and that sustain it over time. Perhaps the
law can only tolerate for so long such a dissonance between the social
world as it imagines it and the social world as we find it.
A case would eventually emerge in the section 2(a) jurisprudence
in which the Court would seek to find space for regard for the collective
interests engaged by religion so forcefully urged in the 1996 dissent in
Adler; and for the reasons that I explored above, it was entirely
unsurprising that the case would be one involving education.
The central question in Loyola83 was how a provincially mandated
“ethics and religious culture” program applied in the context of a private
Catholic high school. The program prescribed a curriculum exposing
students to the beliefs and ethics of different world religions and required
that the instruction on these topics be conducted from a “neutral and
objective perspective.” Loyola objected that requiring a Catholic school to
teach about Catholicism and the ethics of other traditions in a “neutral
way” impaired religious freedom. In finding that Loyola could not be
This has been a critique leveled against Charter adjudication since its early days. See,
e.g., Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto; Buffalo:
University of Toronto Press, 1997).
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compelled to teach about Catholicism “in terms defined by the state rather
than by its own understanding of Catholicism,”84 Justice Abella (now in
the majority) explained that “[r]eligious freedom under the Charter must…
account for the socially embedded nature of religious belief, and the deep
linkages between this belief and its manifestation through communal
institutions and traditions”.85 She acknowledged that “[t]hese collective
aspects of religious freedom — in this case, the collective manifestation
and transmission of Catholic beliefs through a private denominational
school — [were] a crucial part of Loyola’s claim.”86 In its regard for the
collective dimensions of religion and in its recognition of the central role
of education in the sustenance of the religious community, Loyola can be
viewed as the coming of age of the dissent in Adler.
Loyola is, to this point, the strongest statement from the Court
recognizing the collective and group aspects of religious freedom. Indeed,
the minority decision in Loyola, written by Chief Justice McLachlin and
Justice Moldaver, would have gone even further, holding that religious
organizations themselves could enjoy religious freedom under section
2(a). And yet there remains substantial uncertainty about the nature and
scope of this recognition and what it will mean for religious freedom
claims on the part of groups and institutions in the coming years.
It is uncertain, for example, how independent the protection of
these “collective aspects” of religion really is of the Charter’s traditional
focus on the individual. Justice Abella’s describes the collective aspects of
religion as “manifestations” of individual religious belief and she frames
the liberty interests involved as those of the “members of the
community,”87 not the group itself. On this account, the collective
dimension of religious freedom is indexed to the individual: she justifies
the need to give weight to the collective on the grounds that “individuals
may sometimes require a legal entity in order to give effect to the
constitutionally protected communal aspects of their religious beliefs and
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practices.”88 This is true even of the more ambitious minority in Loyola,
who explain that “[t]he freedom of religion of individuals cannot flourish
without freedom of religion for the organizations through which those
individuals express their religious practices and through which they
transmit their faith.”89 Diagnostically, the key test will come when the
collective religious interests are at odds with the individual’s religious
freedom. I suspect that in such a case, the liberal commitments
underwriting the constitutional culture will admit of only one outcome.
And, of course, the subjective sincerity test established in Amselem is
designed precisely to incline the system in that direction.
Owing in part to this conceptual uncertainty, it is unclear how
robust and consequential the courts’ regard for the collective dimension of
religious freedom will prove to be. The way that the Court has treated the
collective aspects of religion since Loyola suggests that both the
engagement and the effect may be modest.
In Ktunaxa,90 an Indigenous nation sought to prevent a ski resort
development in a part of British Columbia on the basis that the
establishment of permanent overnight accommodation would drive
Grizzly Bear Spirit from the valley in question (Qat’muk), fundamentally
disrupting their religious beliefs and practices and, with this, “the vitality
of their religious community”.91 Thus seeking to establish a novel form of
s 2(a) protection — one based on the interrelationship between land and
Ibid at para 33. In TWU 2018, supra note 56, discussed in relation to these ideas more
fully below, Justice Rowe’s separate concurring reasons display what an approach to the
collective or communal dimensions of religious freedom fully indexed to the individual
would look like. He is entirely perspicuous in this: “While acknowledging this
communal aspect, I underscore that religious freedom is premised on the personal
volition of individual believers. Although religious communities may adopt their own
rules and membership requirements, the foundation of the community remains the
voluntary choice of individual believers to join together on the basis of their common
faith” (para 219). Accordingly, he explains, if TWU possessed any religious freedom
rights qua community or institution, “these would not extend beyond those held by the
individual members of the faith community” (ibid).
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the metaphysical — the Ktunaxa emphasized the communal aspects of
religion and religious freedom recognized in Loyola. A majority of the
Court found that there was no breach of the Ktunaxa’s religious freedom
because the “[t]he state’s duty under s. 2(a) is not to protect the object of
beliefs, such as Grizzly Bear Spirit.”92 In arriving at that conclusion, the
majority acknowledged the collective dimension of the right, but swiftly
circumscribed its implications, explaining that “the communal aspects of
freedom of religion do not, and should not, extend s. 2(a)’s protection
beyond the freedom to have beliefs and the freedom to manifest them.”93
In TWU 2018, in which the Court considered the Law Society of
British Columbia’s decision to deny accreditation to TWU’s proposed law
school because of TWU’s discriminatory community covenant, the
majority professed the need to “account for the socially embedded nature
of religious belief, as well as the ‘deep linkages between this belief and its
manifestation through communal institutions and traditions’”,94 as
established in Loyola. And yet these ideas did little work informing the
analysis. The majority framed the nature of “the religious belief or practice
implicated by the LSBC’s decision” in essentially individualistic terms:
“that members of TWU’s community sincerely believe that studying in a
community defined by religious beliefs in which members follow
particular religious rules of conduct contributes to their spiritual
development.”95 This framing — one that did not draw out the communal
and group dimensions of the claim — cleared the way for the majority not
only to find that the LSBC’s decision was reasonable, but (even more
significantly, to my mind) that the effect of the decision on religious

Ibid at para 71. For critiques of this decision, see Howard Kislowicz and Senwung
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freedom was “of minor significance”96 and not “a serious limitation”.97
Justices Coté and Brown, writing in dissent and who would have
characterized the interference with religious freedom as “profound,”98
pointed to this thinness in the majority’s engagement with the collective
dimension of religious freedom: “In our view, ensuring full protection for
the ‘constitutionally protected communal aspects of religious belief and
practice’ requires more than simply aggregating individual rights claims
under the amorphous umbrella of an institution’s ‘community’.”99
We are at an intriguing moment in the development of our religious
freedom jurisprudence, wrestling with and wondering what it means to
give regard to the collective, communal, and institutional aspects of
religious freedom. And we watch with interest as other countries explore
the implications of granting collective and corporate religious rights.100
Along with others, I have found it useful to think about the individual,
private, and choice-based understanding of religion evidenced in religious
96
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freedom jurisprudence as a “protestant” approach to the kind of religion
that attracts constitutional protection.101 If that is an edifying framing, one
wonders whether the emerging, if tentative, concern for the collective
dimensions of religion marks something of a “catholic turn” in religious
freedom in Canada; and how ironic that we might trace the intellectual
origins of that shift to the dissent in Adler.
CONCLUSION: REASSESSING ADLER?
In this paper I have used Adler as kind of vantage point from which
to survey the past of the constitutional protection of religion in Canada
and the future that lay ahead. Reading Adler this way directs our gaze
backward, showing the durable role of origins in our contemporary
constitutional lives. Concerned as it was with the interaction of the
historical compromise surrounding religion and religious education found
in section 93 and the modern rights-protecting focus of ss. 2(a) and 15(1),
the reasons in Adler — and, in particular, their analytical weaknesses —
demonstrate the way in which our contemporary constitutional identities
are not exhausted by the logic of the universal. Adler also invites us to
consider the complicated but formative use of religion in Canadian nationbuilding and in claims about sovereignty, matters in which religion
continues to serve an evocative role.
Adler, we saw, would also anticipate much. Looking forward, Adler
pointed to the abidingly central place that education would occupy in
debates about the constitutional protection of religion in Canada. In
particular, Adler opened up the question of what place religion could or
should have within an otherwise non-religious system of public education,
a question that would be — in one form or another — at the heart of the
section 2(a) jurisprudence in the years to come. And although, in the
intervening years, the individualism that comes so naturally to Charter
analysis would take centre stage, the forceful call made in the dissent in
Adler for attention to the collective and group dimensions of religious

See Berger, supra note 72 at 100–101; Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of
Religious Freedom (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 7–8.
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freedom prefigured the ineluctable salience of the interests of the
community in matters of religious freedom and equality.
In short, in Adler we can find themes and tensions that have defined
our constitutional history in regard to religion, as well as markers for what
would (and still does) lie ahead. But in closing I want to return briefly to
a question that I alluded to at the outset of this piece: what of the future of
the Adler decision itself? Specifically, is the majority’s holding that the
Charter has nothing to say about the constitutionality of the
denominational school funding scheme in Ontario still good law? In my
view, after two decades during which that outcome seemed wholly secure,
the decision mayx now be vulnerable.102
We are now living in a post-Bedford,103 post-Carter,104 precedential
ecosystem, in which the Supreme Court’s openness to revisiting past
decisions is very much on the minds of advocates and scholars. Bedford
established that a trial judge can revisit a decision of a higher court,
including the Supreme Court, “if new legal issues are raised as a
consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a change
in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters
of the debate.”105 Applying this test in Carter, the Court explained that the
trial judge was justified in revisiting the Court’s decision in Rodriguez106
because of changes both in the “matrix of legislative and social facts”107
and because of material changes in the law of section 7. In particular, the
Court noted that “the law on overbreadth, now explicitly recognized as a
principle of fundamental justice, asks whether the law interferes with

I am conscious of the unsuccessful attempt to revisit Adler made in Landau v Ontario
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some conduct that has no connection to the law’s objectives…. This
different question may lead to a different answer.”108 And indeed it did.
A future applicant might well be able to point to changes in the
circumstances or evidence relevant to considering the issues raised in
Adler.109 But changes in the evidence and circumstances are not necessary;
they are just one path to revisiting a past precedent. The case for
developments in the law significant enough to reassess the s 2(a) outcome
in Adler — the other path — is a strong one. Earlier in this article I
canvassed one jurisprudential piece that is newly in motion in a way that
might have implications for a fresh look at Adler, namely the rise of regard
for group and collective interests within the section 2(a) analysis. I have
argued elsewhere that serious attention to the interest of the group, regard
of the sort found in Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent, would have made
the result in Adler more difficult to reach.110
But perhaps the even more material change in the applicable legal
framework is the emergence of a state duty of religious neutrality as a
component of the section 2(a) protection. Crystallized in Mouvement laïque
québécois v Saguenay (City),111 this duty is one that the Court acknowledged
is not expressly imposed by section 2(a) but, rather, has arisen “from an
evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion.”112 The core
of this duty is the requirement that “that the state neither favour nor hinder
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any particular belief, and the same holds true for non-belief”.113 Drawing
inspiration for this duty from the jurisprudence subsequent to Adler,
Justice Gascon, writing for an 8 person majority explained that this duty
means, in part, that “[t]he state may not act in such a way as to create a
preferential public space that favours certain religious groups and is
hostile to others.”114 He summed up as follows:
When all is said and done, the state's duty to protect every
person's freedom of conscience and religion means that it
may not use its powers in such a way as to promote the
participation of certain believers or non-believers in public
life to the detriment of others.115
The tensions between this emergent doctrine and the funding scheme
considered in Adler might be palpable enough to invite, at least, a fresh
hard look. To paraphrase the Court’s reasons in Carter, the duty of state
neutrality, now explicitly recognized as an aspect of section 2(a), asks a
new question about the constitutionality of state action. “This different
question may lead to a different answer.”116
One might object that these developments, significant though they
may be, say nothing that displaces Justice Iacobucci’s core finding for the
majority in Adler that section 93 is a “complete code” for denominational
funding and therefore simply “immune from Charter attack.”117 Perhaps
so, but it must be recalled that four judges rejected this approach to the
issues and instead relied on an interpretation of section 2(a) whereby, they
agreed, there was no breach. The three reasons that took this path focused
on the absence of a prohibition or coercion and the fact that religious
freedom does not include a positive right to funding.118 There is simply
far more to section 2(a) today. Can the unanimous ruling in Adler that the
113

Ibid at para 72.

114

Ibid at para 75.

115

Ibid at para 76.

116

Carter, supra note 104 at para 46.

117

Adler, supra note 1 at para 50.
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denominational funding scheme did not offend section 2(a)’s protections
survive these notable changes in the law of religious freedom?
Exploring these points more fully is the burden of another piece.
For now, all of this is to suggest that, in addition to serving as an entry
point into understanding key elements of the history and development of
law and religion in Canada, reassessing Adler might itself be part of our
constitutional future.
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